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ESSAYS

THE SHAME GAME: MONTANA’S RIGHT TO PRIVACY
FOR LEVEL 1 SEX OFFENDERS
Johnna Preble*

“The days of the far-off future would toil onward, still with the same burden
for her to take up, and bear along with her, but never to fling down; for the
accumulating days, and added years, would pile up their misery upon the heap
of shame.”1

I.

INTRODUCTION

In April 2006, Stephen Marshall collected the names and addresses of
34 people from Maine’s sex offender registry.2 Maine publishes photos,
names, addresses, and criminal histories of about 2,220 sex offenders on the
internet for public viewing.3 Shortly after acquiring his list, Marshall went
to the homes of two of the convicted sex offenders, William Elliott and
Joseph Gray, and shot each of them to death.4 Later that day, while police
were attempting to apprehend him, Marshall shot and killed himself.5 The
only link connecting the two victims was their placement on Maine’s sex
offender registry.6
* B.A., University of Montana, 2008; J.D., University of Montana School of Law, 2013; I am
very grateful to Stacey Gordon for all of her suggestions, editing, and encouragement. I also owe many
thanks to Chad Preble for opening my eyes to this issue and supporting me through the writing process.
1. Nathaniel Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter 91 (James Osgood & Company 1876).
2. Gitika Ahuja, ABC News, Sex Offender Registries: Putting Lives at Risk? (Apr. 18, 2006)
(available at http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=1855771).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Amy Clark, CBS News, Sex Offender Murder Suspect Kills Self (April 17, 2006) (available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/sex-offender-murder-suspect-kills-self/).
6. Ahuja, supra n. 2.
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One of the victims, William Elliott, was only 24 years old at the time
of his murder. His mother considered him a “warm, loving young man” and
stated that without the registry “he’d still be alive today.”7
For devices intended to fix societal ills, sex offender registries often
create as many problems as they attempt to correct. From the vigilante justice enforced by people like Marshall to the difficulties faced by offenders
attempting to find jobs, the collateral issues created by sex offender registries often outweigh their use as public safety mechanisms, particularly for
lower-level offenders.
Politicians often cite high recidivism rates to justify sex offender registries to the public.8 However, as with any statistic, recidivism rates can be
manipulated.9 Frequently the rates cited include parole and probation violations, as well as new offenses committed by the offenders that are not sexual in nature.10 Also, the recidivism rates often cited are those for sexual
deviants and not those of low-level sex offenders.11 By definition, low-level
sex offenders are placed in low-level groups because they have a lower
likelihood of committing a repeat offense.12
Sex offender registries have been challenged federally under the Ex
Post Facto, Double Jeopardy, and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.13 Similar challenges to both the sex offender and violent offender
registries have been brought in Montana based on the Montana Constitution’s Ex Post Facto and Right to Privacy Clauses.14 However, an argument
targeted specifically towards lower-level designations has never been
brought before either the U.S. Supreme Court or the Montana Supreme
Court.
The Montana Constitution has an enumerated right to privacy; the U.S.
Constitution does not. As a result, the State has a higher burden to overcome when infringing on the right to privacy.15 Because Level 1 sex offenders, by definition, have a low likelihood to reoffend, the laws requiring
7. Id.
8. Human Rights Watch, No Easy Answers: Sex Offender Laws in the U.S. 21, http://www.hrw.
org/reports/2007/09/11/no-easy-answers (Sept. 11, 2007).
9. Id. at 26.
10. Tim Bynum, Recidivism of Sex Offenders, http://www.csom.org/pubs/recidsexof.html (May
2001).
11. Id.
12. Mont. Code Ann. § 46–23–509(2)(a) (2013).
13. Stephen R. McAllister, “Neighbors Beware”: The Constitutionality of State Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Laws, 29 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 97, 100–101 (1998). See also Smith
v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003).
14. See State v. Brooks, 289 P.3d 105 (Mont. 2012); State v. Mount, 78 P.3d 829 (Mont. 2003).
15. See Brooks, 289 P.3d at 108.
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them to register are arguably unconstitutional in Montana.16 This article
argues that the burden placed on Level 1 sex offenders when they are forced
to register far outweighs the public safety interest under Montana’s right to
privacy.
Part II of this article discusses the history of sex offender registries
both federally and in Montana. Part III further explains Montana’s heightened right to privacy, describes the sex offender tier designation system in
Montana, discusses current sex offender recidivism rates, and further defines some of the policy issues associated with sex offender registries.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Act and Right to Privacy
1. The History of Federal Sex Offender Registration Laws
In 1994, in response to the heinous rape and murder committed against
seven-year-old Megan Kanka by a repeat sexual predator, New Jersey
passed “Megan’s Law.”17 Although Megan’s Law was not the first stateimposed sex offender registration statute,18 it has become one of the most
well-known. Megan’s Law spurred the development of similar laws in
many other states.19
In 1994, Congress quickly followed suit by enacting the Jacob Wetterling Act.20 With this Act, Congress created federal guidelines for states
to generate their own sex offender registries.21 The Act also created financial incentives for states that developed these registries.22 It further indicated which type of crimes a person must have committed to be considered
a “sex offender” and the procedures governing the registration process.23
Finally, Congress set up criminal liability for sex offenders who failed to
register and permitted states to develop public notification requirements.24
16. Mont. Code Ann. § 46–23–509 (outlines the different level designations for sex offenders and
states that for a Level 1 sex offender “the risk of a repeat sexual offense is low”).
17. Michele L. Earl-Hubbard, The Child Sex Offender Registration Laws: The Punishment, Liberty
Deprivation, and Unintended Results Associated with the Scarlet Letter Laws of the 1990s, 90 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 788, 789, 795 (1996).
18. California was the first state to enact sex offender registration laws in 1947. State of California
Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General, Sex Offender Registration and Exclusion Information, http://www.meganslaw.ca.gov/sexreg.aspx (2009).
19. E.g. Smith, 538 U.S. 84.
20. McAllister, supra n. 13, at 101.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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In 1996, the Act was amended to require, rather than just permit, certain
public notifications.25 The Act specifically states that the federal guidelines
required for the financial incentives set only a minimum standard for states,
and that states may impose any additional restrictions on sex offenders that
they see fit.26
2. Federal Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Challenges to the Sex
Offender Registry
In Smith v. Doe,27 the U.S. Supreme Court heard challenges to state
sex offender registry and notification laws under both the Ex Post Facto and
Double Jeopardy Clauses of the federal constitution.28 Both of these challenges apply only to people convicted of sex offenses before registration
and notification laws were passed in their particular state.29 The crux of
both challenges rests in whether the registration and notification laws constitute further punishment for the offense.30
Double jeopardy analysis begins with the language of the clause. The
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment states, “[N]or shall any
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb . . . .”31 The Double Jeopardy Clause is applicable to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.32 The Supreme
Court has interpreted this clause to apply in three situations: “(1) a second
prosecution for the same offense following an acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments
for the same offense.”33 Sex offender registration and notification laws only
apply to the third situation.34 The respondents in Smith v. Doe, as had other
sex offenders who challenged registry laws under the Double Jeopardy
Clause in state courts, mainly argued that the dissemination of their personal information constituted additional “punishment” for same offense for
which they were already punished.35
Like the double jeopardy analysis, the ex post facto analysis begins
with the language of the clause. Article I of the U.S. Constitution states,
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 102–103.
McAllister, supra n. 13, at 103.
Smith, 538 U.S. 84.
Id. at 97; McAllister, supra n. 13, at 111.
McAllister, supra n. 13, at 111.
Id. at 113–114.
U.S. Const. amend. V.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
McAllister, supra n. 13, at 112.
Id.
Smith, 538 U.S. at 92; McAllister, supra n. 13, at 112.
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“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”36 In Latin, “ex
post facto” translates to “after the fact.”37 Essentially, the Supreme Court
has held this clause only applies to punitive laws that disadvantage the person convicted.38 The Court has held that a constitutionally-prohibited ex
post facto law “(1) punishes as a crime conduct that was not criminal when
committed, (2) retroactively increases the punishment for a crime after its
commission, or (3) deprives a defendant of a legal defense that was available at the time the crime was committed.”39 Challenges to sex offender
registry and notification laws only apply under the second category of prohibited ex post facto laws.40 The respondents in Smith v. Doe again argued
that the dissemination of their personal information constituted retroactive,
additional “punishment.”41 Thus, the question at the root of both double
jeopardy and ex post facto challenges is whether registration and notification laws constitute “punishment.”42
In Smith v. Doe, the Court addressed exactly that question.43 It determined whether Alaska’s registration and notification laws, which applied
retroactively, constituted additional punishment under the Ex Post Facto
Clause.44 First, the Court turned to the express and implied intent of the
Alaska Legislature in passing the law.45 Because the Legislature stated that
dissemination of sex offender information would help in protecting the public safety, the Court determined its stated intent was not punitive.46 The
Court then analyzed the implied intent of the Legislature.47 It determined
that the location of the statute in the code,48 as well as the enforcement
mechanisms in place,49 showed that the implied purpose of the Legislature
“was to create a civil, nonpunitive regime.”50 Finally, the Court analyzed
the statute using the Mendoza-Martinez factors that were first developed in
double jeopardy jurisprudence.51 The Court noted that the factors should be
read as “neither exhaustive nor dispositive.”52 The factors are “whether, in
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
McAllister, supra n. 13, at 113.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 112.
Id. at 113–114.
Smith, 538 U.S. at 92.
Id.
Id. at 93.
Id.
Id. at 93–94.
Id. at 94–95.
Smith, 538 U.S. at 95.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 97.
Id. (quoting U.S. v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980)).
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its necessary operation, the regulatory scheme: has been regarded in our
history and traditions as a punishment; imposes an affirmative disability or
restraint; promotes the traditional aims of punishment; has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or is excessive with respect to this purpose.”53 Addressing each factor in turn, the Court determined the statute
was not punitive in nature.54
Some of the Justices, in their concurring and dissenting opinions for
this case, disagreed with the majority, finding the laws punitive in nature.55
In Justice Souter’s concurring opinion he stated, “This means that for me
this is a close case, for I not only agree with the Court that there is evidence
pointing to an intended civil characterization of the Act, but also see considerable evidence pointing the other way.”56 He explained that the Act’s
placement within the code and enforcement also can point towards the penal nature of the Act.57 While discussing the intent of the Legislature, Justice Souter stated, “The fact that the Act uses past crime as the touchstone,
probably sweeping in a significant number of people who pose no real
threat to the community, serves to feed suspicion that something more than
regulation of safety is going on . . . .”58 While he saw this as a close case,
Justice Souter agreed with the majority opinion because of the presumption
of constitutionally afforded to the laws of the states.59
Justice Stevens in his dissent, and Justice Ginsburg in a separate dissent joined by Justice Breyer, disagreed with the majority, finding the burdens and stigma placed on sex offenders through registry requirements were
clearly punitive and thus violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.60 In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg stated, “As Justice STEVENS and Justice
SOUTER spell out, Alaska’s Act imposes onerous and intrusive obligations
on convicted sex offenders; and it exposes registrants, through aggressive
public notification of their crimes, to profound humiliation and communitywide ostracism.”61
3. The Federal Due Process Challenge
In Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe,62 the Court determined that state sex offender registries and notification laws did not violate
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1962)).
Id. at 97–106.
Smith, 538 U.S. at 106–118 (Souter, J., concurring; Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 107 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 108 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 109 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 110 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 110–118 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
Smith, 538 U.S. at 115 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Connecticut Dept. of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol75/iss2/4

6

Preble: The Shame Game: Montana's Right To Privacy For Level 1 Sex Offenders
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\75-2\MON201.txt

2014

unknown

Seq: 7

5-JUN-14

THE SHAME GAME

12:16

303

an individual’s procedural due process rights under the Constitution.63 The
respondent in the case argued that because he was not a dangerous sexual
offender, the law “deprive[d] him of a liberty interest—his reputation combined with the alteration of his status under state law—without notice or a
meaningful opportunity to be heard.”64 Essentially, the Court held that determination of the current level of danger posed by an offender is not required under the Connecticut statute because the State has chosen to publicize the information of all sex offenders and not just those currently dangerous; thus, the determination is moot.65 Furthermore, the Court stated that
the respondent argued a procedural due process right, so a decision on
whether the statute violates a substantive due process right must wait for
another day.66
B. The Montana Sex and Violent Offender Registration Act and
Right to Privacy
1. History of the Act
The Montana Legislature enacted the Sexual Offender Registration
Act in 1989.67 The Act included both registration and notification laws for
sex offenders.68 In 1995, the Legislature amended the Act to include violent
offenders and renamed it as the “Sexual and Violent Offender Registration
Act” (SVORA).69 In 1997, the Legislature amended the Act again, this time
to make the registration and notification requirements apply retroactively to
sex offenders.70 Also at this time, the Legislature included a preamble to the
Act.71
The preamble to SVORA includes the concerns that prompted its
adoption.72 The listed concerns are:
(1) the danger of recidivism posed by sexual and violent offenders and the
protection of the public; (2) the impairment of law enforcement’s efforts to
protect communities from lack of information about offenders; (3) the prevention of victimization and the prompt resolution of sexual or violent offenses;
(4) the sexual or violent offender’s reduced expectation of privacy because of
the public’s interest in safety; and (5) the furtherance of the primary govern63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 8.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 8.
Mount, 78 P.3d at 832.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Brooks, 289 P.3d at 107.
Id.
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mental interest of protecting specific vulnerable groups and the public in general from potential harm.73

2. Statutory Scheme
The Montana Code Annotated provides the statutory framework for
registration and notification of sex offenders under Title 46, which is dedicated to Criminal Procedure. Section 46–23–502 defines a sexual or violent
offender as “a person who has been convicted of or, in youth court, found to
have committed or been adjudicated for a sexual or violent offense.”74 Section 46–23–504 requires sexual and violent offenders to register within
three days of changing residences.75 Sections 46–23–506(1) and (3) allow
for Level 1 sex offenders to petition the court to avoid the obligation to
register if they have met certain requirements. Section 46–23–507 provides
that the penalty for failing to register is “imprisonment of not more than 5
years” or a fine of “not more than $10,000” or both.76 Section 46–23–508
allows for the dissemination of a Level 1 offender’s address, name, photograph, physical description, date of birth, and offenses for which the offender is required to register.77 Finally, § 46–23–509 outlines the different
level designations for sex offenders and states that for a Level 1 sex offender “the risk of a repeat sexual offense is low.”78
3. Montana’s Right to Privacy
Article II, section 10, of the Montana Constitution states: “The right of
individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall
not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.”79 The
Montana Supreme Court has interpreted this section to provide Montanans
with a fundamental right of individual privacy.80 This right is protected if
“(1) the individual had a subjective or actual expectation of privacy and (2)
society is willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.”81 An infringement on an individual’s fundamental right to privacy is subject to
strict scrutiny.82 The strict scrutiny analysis requires the law to be “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”83
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Mont. Code Ann. § 46–23–502.
Id. at § 46–23–504(1).
Id. at § 46–23–507.
Id. at § 46–23–508(1)(b)(ii)(A) through (D).
Id. at § 46–23–509(2)(a).
Mont. Const. art. II, § 10.
Brooks, 289 P.3d at 105.
Id. at 108.
Id.
Id.
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4. Montana Challenges to the Sex Offender Registry
The Montana Supreme Court has decided two cases involving the constitutionality of SVORA under the Ex Post Facto and the Right to Privacy
clauses of the Montana Constitution. In 2003 the Court decided the first
case, State v. Mount,84 under Article II, section 31 of the Constitution.85
The Ex Post Facto Clause states: “No ex post facto law nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts, or making any irrevocable grant of special
privileges, franchises, or immunities, shall be passed by the Legislature.”86
As it has for other criminal cases, the Court used a three-part test to determine whether SVORA constituted an ex post facto law.87 The Court stated
that “a law is ex post facto if it: (1) punishes as a crime an act which was
not unlawful when committed; (2) makes punishment for a crime more burdensome; or (3) deprives [a] person charged with a crime of any defense
available under the law at the time the act was committed.”88 In line with
the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach in Smith v. Doe, the Court assessed
SVORA using the Mendoza-Martinez factors.89 The Court found SVORA
to be nonpunitive in nature.90
The next issue addressed by the Mount Court was whether SVORA
infringed on the privacy rights of offenders.91 Mount argued, under Article
II, section 28 of the Montana Constitution, that when he was discharged, all
of his rights should have been restored, including his right to privacy.92 The
relevant section of the Constitution states, “Full rights are restored by termination of state supervision for any offense against the state.”93 The Court
found that although Mount’s right to privacy was implicated by the requirement that he register, the state had the compelling interest of protecting
public safety in enforcing the laws.94 The Court also found the laws to be
narrowly tailored to meet only those concerns in a reasonable way.95
Throughout this opinion, the Court did not differentiate between the three
levels of sex offenders identified by statute in Montana.96
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Mount, 78 P.3d 829 (Mont. 2003).
Id. at 833.
Mont. Const. art. II, § 31.
Mount, 78 P.3d at 834.
Id.
Id. at 837–841.
Id. at 841.
Id.
Id.
Mont. Const. art. II, § 28(2).
Mount, 78 P.3d at 842.
Id.
Id. at 833–842.
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In 2012, the Court decided State v. Brooks.97 The Brooks Court determined whether requiring a violent offender to register violated his right to
privacy under the Montana Constitution.98 Brooks, while not a sex offender,
was required to register under SVORA as a violent offender for his prior
conviction of felony arson.99
The Court reasoned that in creating the laws requiring sexual and violent offenders to register, the Legislature effectively reduced the expectation
of privacy for these types of offenders “because of the public’s interest in
safety.”100 The Court then discussed the strict scrutiny requirement for laws
infringing on fundamental rights and the reasoning of Mount.101 Brooks
argued that because the recidivism rates of arsonists are less than those of
sex offenders, the public safety interest in requiring him to register is less
compelling.102 The Court disagreed, citing the Legislature’s intent as indicated by the specific inclusion of violent offenders in SVORA.103 Brooks
also argued that the laws were not narrowly tailored based on the lack of
level designations for violent offenders.104 The Court rejected this argument
because violent offenders are required to release less information through
registration laws than sex offenders, thus making level designations unnecessary.105 The Court added that the laws are even more narrowly tailored
for violent offenders because they generally require registration for lesser
amounts of time than sex offenders.106 Ultimately, the Court held that the
violent offender registration requirements of SVORA do not violate the
Montana constitutional right to privacy.107 Again, however, the Court mentioned sex offender level designation, but the individual levels were not
addressed specifically.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Montana Sex Offender Tier Levels
The Montana Code Annotated designates sex offenders into one of
three levels.108 For Level 1 sex offenders, “the risk of a repeat sexual of97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Brooks, 289 P.3d 105.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 108.
Id. at 109.
Id.
Brooks, 289 P.3d at 109.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mont. Code Ann. § 46–23–509(2).
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fense is low.”109 For Level 2 sex offenders, “the risk of a repeat sexual
offense is moderate.”110 For Level 3 sex offenders, “the risk of a repeat
sexual offense is high, there is a threat to public safety, and the sexual
offender evaluator believes that the offender is a sexually violent
predator.”111 The statute provides that at the time of sentencing, the court
reviews “the sexual offender evaluation report, any statement by a victim,
and any statement by the offender” to determine the offender’s level designation.112
On its website, the Montana Department of Justice (Montana DOJ)
further explains the tier-level system of identifying and placing sex offenders on the registry.113 The Montana DOJ sheds some light on the method
used to determine a sex offender’s level designation.114 Essentially, the
website states that the offender’s crime and past behavior are compared to
other similarly-situated individuals who have been released from prison and
how high of a risk these others posed to public safety.115 Further, in its
statement on the purpose of tier levels, the Montana DOJ states, “Tier levels
are a method of assessment to predict the likelihood that a sexual offender
will reoffend. Tier levels also assess the threat that an offender poses to
public safety.”116 Although the Montana DOJ claims this method is “scientific,” these guidelines are not codified in any regulation and therefore do
not adhere to any transparent public process.117
Important information to take from SVORA itself and from the State’s
website is that the Montana Legislature made a conscious decision to differentiate between certain types of sex offenders. In creating levels based on
the possible public safety threat, the Legislature implicitly acknowledged
that not all types of sex offenders recidivate, and thus not all offenders
should be treated in the same way. Why then, if someone is classified by
the court as a Level 1 sex offender because he poses a low risk of reoffending, would he be required to follow registration and notification requirements making his private information widely available to the public?
A Missoula clinical psychologist and member of the Montana Sexual
Offender Treatment Association, Michael Scollati, agrees that the law is
109. Id. at § 46–23–509(2)(a).
110. Id. at § 46–23–509(2)(b).
111. Id. at § 46–23–509(2)(c).
112. Id. at § 46–23–509(3).
113. Montana Department of Justice, Offender Types and Tier Levels, https://app.doj.mt.gov/apps/
svow/offendertypes.aspx#types (accessed Apr. 14, 2013).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. See also Admin. R. Mont. 20.7.301–20.7.304 (2013) (these regulations deal only with the
qualifications and certification of sex offender evaluators and do not provide insight into the methods
used to determine tier levels).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2014

11

Montana Law Review, Vol. 75 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 4
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\75-2\MON201.txt

308

unknown

Seq: 12

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

5-JUN-14

12:16

Vol. 75

overly broad. In a 2014 interview he stated, “The guy that is 18 years old
and has sex with a 15-year-old and gets convicted of statutory rape—he’s
way different than the pedophile that’s been grooming and accessing kids
for 20 years.”118 Clearly, as sex offenses vary greatly, so too should the
requirements for registration.
B. Recidivism
Although local statistics are difficult to track down based on sex-offender level designation, national statistics may help fill in the blanks.119
Statistics often have shortcomings, and certain problems can arise when
attempting to determine precise recidivism rates for sex offenders.120 Because sex crimes often go undetected, an underreporting of incidents may
skew recidivism statistics.121 Also, as discussed above, sex offenders are
often grouped together in statistical analyses without accounting for the differences in their crimes and levels of threat to the public.122 Another major
problem with sex offender recidivism statistics is how “recidivism” is defined within any given study.123 Sometimes recidivism can mean that the
offender was arrested or convicted for another sex crime, and sometimes it
can just mean the offender had a new, non-sex-crime arrest.124 The definition of recidivism depends entirely on the researcher’s whim, which makes
it difficult to analyze multiple studies together.125 Finally, recidivism statistics may be skewed because of the differing follow-up methods and periods
of various studies.126 For example, an offender who has not been in prison
may have more opportunities to reoffend and thus possess a higher recidivism rate over a five-year period than an offender who spent those five
years incarcerated.127 The issues associated with gathering and presenting
recidivism rates suggest those statistics promulgated by various special interest groups and politicians should be closely analyzed and not blindly
followed.
118. Jacqueline Quynh, Sexual offenders living near Missoula school prompts concern, KPAX.com,
http://www.kpax.com/news/sexual-offenders-living-near-missoula-school-prompts-concern/ (Feb. 4,
2014).
119. One Montana news article stated the re-offense rate for all level sex offenders in Montana was
2% in 2009, however, the source of this statistic was not provided. Id.
120. Lisa Williams-Taylor, Increased Surveillance of Sex Offenders, Impacts on Recidivism 53–81
(Marilyn McShane, Frank P. Williams III, eds., LFB Scholarly 2012).
121. Id. at 53–54.
122. Id. at 54–57.
123. Id. at 57–58.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Williams-Taylor, supra n. 120, at 58.
127. Id. at 60–61.
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Although politicians and the media often report outrageous percentages of sex offenders recidivating, frequently in the 80–90% range, some
carefully conducted research has found startlingly different information.128
In 2005, researchers Hanson and Morton-Bourgon conducted a meta-analysis on 82 existing recidivism studies.129 While they found that 36.2% of sex
offenders generally recidivate, only 13.7% of these offenders sexually
recidivated and only 14.3% violently recidivated.130
Another study found that sex offenders really do not recidivate more
than other types of criminals.131 In 2002, researchers Langan and Levin
found that within a three-year period recidivism rates were as follows: burglary, 76%; robbery, 70.2%; drug offenses, 66.7%; and rape, 46%.132
Considering that SVORA is based primarily on the theory that sex
offenders recidivate at alarming rates, the studies cited above provide a basis for the dismantling of the entire registry and notification scheme. This
argument is even stronger when specifically addressing whether Level 1 sex
offenders must register, as they present the lowest risk of threat to public
safety. In reality, if sex offenders really do not recidivate at high rates, and
Level 1 offenders have the lowest likelihood of recidivism, requiring them
to register appears to be an infringement on these offenders’ privacy rights,
as well as a waste of state resources.
C. Problems with the Montana Supreme Court’s Reasoning
Montana case law regarding sex offender registry fails to recognize the
differences in the levels of sex offenders designated by the Legislature in
SVORA. The Court should address the reasoning behind the Legislature’s
decision to treat different types of sex offenders differently. Particularly, the
Court bases its compelling state interest on the need for public safety.133
However, if the Legislature specifically designated a group of sex offenders
who are at a low risk to reoffend and pose a low threat to public safety, that
interest is arguably no longer compelling.
Also, without a significant public safety interest, the registration and
notification laws as applied to Level 1 sex offenders can no longer be considered narrowly tailored as they no longer specifically accomplish only
their intended goals. Instead of promoting public safety through awareness
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Human Rights Watch, supra n. 8, at 4.
Williams-Taylor, supra n. 120, at 54.
Id.
Id.
Id. (The sample size for this study included 9,691 sex offenders.).
Mount, 78 P.3d at 840.
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of a sex offender in the neighborhood, the law incites neighbors’ fear toward someone who likely poses no threat.134
Another interest stated by the Court for requiring registration and notification is to ensure sex offender information is readily available to law
enforcement officers in the event a crime is committed.135 Although this
may provide justification for the registration aspect of SVORA, the notification aspect of the law would still not be narrowly tailored. Alerting the
public of the location of sex offenders does little to aid police investigations. Also, for policy reasons discussed below, this reasoning may fall flat
as well.
Another major problem with the reasoning of the Montana Supreme
Court as it applies to Level 1 sex offenders is its reasoning that because a
public safety interest exists, a sex offender must give up a part of her privacy right.136 Again, if the public safety interest is low and the right to
privacy in Montana is considered fundamental, the Court lacks justification
for abrogating an offender’s rights. This argument is particularly salient
when paired with the Article II, section 28 argument in Mount. If an offender in Montana is entitled to a full restoration of her rights, and the
public safety interest is low, then the offender should be entitled to a full
restoration of her right to privacy upon the termination of her state supervision.
Although this argument is not directed specifically to ex post facto or
double jeopardy concerns with SVORA, a major problem with the Court’s
rationale in both Mount and Brooks is its reasoning that registration and
notification laws are not intended to punish sex and violent offenders. As
stated in Justice Leaphart’s Mount dissent, as well as by Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer in Smith v. Doe, the consequences imposed on
sex offenders through registration requirements are clearly punitive.137 As
stated by Justice Stevens, “a sanction that (1) is imposed on everyone who
commits a criminal offense, (2) is not imposed on anyone else, and (3)
severely impairs a person’s liberty is punishment.”138 After all, was Hester
Prynne’s scarlet “A” not a warning to others but rather a punishment for her
bad acts?

134. See Kidpower, A Sex Offender Is Living in Our Neighborhood! HELP!, http://www.kidpower.
org/library/article/sex-offender/ (accessed Apr. 26, 2013).
135. Mount, 78 P.3d at 838.
136. Brooks, 289 P.3d at 108.
137. Mount, 78 P.3d at 842; Smith, 538 U.S. at 111, 114–115, 118.
138. Smith, 538 U.S. at 113.
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D. Policy
As noted by Illinois State Representative John Fritchey, “The reality is
that sex offenders are a great political target, but that doesn’t mean any law
under the sun is appropriate.”139 Many policy reasons exist for eliminating
registries entirely, or at least for those offenders who pose little threat to
public safety such as Level 1 sex offenders in Montana. The Human Rights
Watch gives only a sampling of the public hostility often directed towards
sex offenders:
Former offenders included on online sex offender registries endure shattered
privacy, social ostracism, diminished employment and housing opportunities,
harassment, and even vigilante violence. Their families suffer as well. Registrants and their families have been hounded from their homes, had rocks
thrown through their home windows, and feces left on their front doorsteps.
They have been assaulted, stabbed, and had their homes burned by neighbors
or strangers who discovered their status as a previously convicted sex offender. At least four registrants have been targeted and killed (two in 2006
and two in 2005) by strangers who found their names and addresses through
online registries. Other registrants have been driven to suicide, including a
teenager who was required to register after he had exposed himself to girls on
their way to gym class. Violence directed at registrants has injured others.
The children of sex offenders have been harassed by their peers at school, and
wives and girlfriends of offenders have been ostracized from social networks
and at their jobs.140

Finding a job or a place to live constitutes a major problem faced daily
by sex offenders in Montana.141 Besides simply being rejected by possible
employers and landlords who require disclosure of felonies on applications
or scan the registry for all applicants, sex offenders on supervision must
also adhere to the rules put in place by their parole or probation officers,
which frequently limit the neighborhoods in which offenders are allowed to
live.142 The justification for these limitations rests on preventing sex offenders from reoffending by keeping them away from schools and other
places where children gather.143 However, no evidence exists that keeping a
sex offender from living or working in the vicinity of children will protect
children from becoming victims of sex crimes.144 Some research even suggests that child molesters often find their victims far from their own homes
139. Human Rights Watch, supra n. 8, at 2.
140. Id. at 7.
141. Mary Ann Farkas and Gale Miller, Reentry and Reintegration: Challenges Faced by the Families of Convicted Sex Offenders, 20 Fed. Senten. Rep. 88, 89–90 (Dec. 2007).
142. Montana Department of Corrections, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.cor.mt.gov/
Facts/pandp.mcpx (accessed Mar. 17, 2014).
143. Human Rights Watch, supra n. 8, at 8–10.
144. Id.
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to avoid exposure.145 Additionally, living restrictions on sex offenders may
require they move further away from their supervision, treatment, and support networks.146
Although part of the justification for sex offender registry and notification laws includes easy accessibility of information to law enforcement officials in the event a crime is committed, the registration system may in fact
inhibit police more than help them.147 When a crime is committed in a
certain neighborhood, and the registry is loaded with sex offenders living in
that area, many of whom do not pose a significant threat, the police may
waste significant time investigating these offenders while the actual culprit
remains at large.148
Finally, substantial costs exist in maintaining sex offender registries
and notifications, as well as arresting, convicting, and incarcerating those
who fail to abide by Montana’s strict three-day registration requirement.
The man-hours expended by updating the online registry are massive. Nationally, registration and notification laws cost tax payers millions of dollars.149 Rather than requiring low-threat sex offenders to register, this
money may be better spent on sex crime prevention, education, awareness,
counseling, and treatment.150
IV.

CONCLUSION

Level 1 sex offenders in Montana are placed in an interesting predicament. While the Legislature and the Court formally state that they pose little
threat to the public, they are still treated the same as higher-level sex offenders yet differently than other criminal offenders. They are required by
the State to surrender some of their privacy right based on the need for
public safety when they have been designated a low risk to this same public. They face social ostracism and vigilante justice for crimes for which
they were told they had served their time. They have difficulty finding jobs,
finding homes, and finding neighbors who will not verbally torment them.
Their families are stigmatized. They are notified that they are not allowed to
attend their children’s school events.151 All the while, they are told by the
Montana Supreme Court that this response is not punishment.
145. Id. at 7.
146. Id. at 11.
147. Id. at 9–10.
148. Id. at 9.
149. Human Rights Watch, supra n. 8, at 10.
150. Id.
151. Montana City School District Policy, Community Relations, http://montanacity.schoolwires.
com/cms/lib7/MT15000323/Centricity/Domain/47/4550.pdf (accessed Mar. 17, 2014).
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The story of William Elliot, one of the victims discussed above who
was targeted because of his place on Maine’s sex offender registry, provides
a clear example of why sex offender registry and notification laws are unsuitable for low-level sex offenders. William was convicted of a sex crime
and placed on the registry for having sex with his girlfriend.152 At the time
of his offense, he was 20 and his girlfriend was only a few days away from
turning 16.153 Vigilante justice against sex offenders took the life of a
young man with a promising future.
“The scarlet letter was her passport into regions where other women
dared not tread. Shame, Despair, Solitude! These had been her teachers,—
stern and wild ones,—and they had made her strong, but taught her much
amiss.”154

152. Ahuja, supra n. 2.
153. Id.
154. Hawthorne, supra n. 1, at 226–227.
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